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ABSTRACT
User association logs collected from a large-scale wireless
LAN record where and when a user has used the network.
Such information plays an important role in wireless network
research. One concern of sharing these data with other re-
searchers, however, is that the logs pose potential privacy
risks for the network users. Today, the common practice in
sanitizing these data before releasing them to the public is
to anonymize users’ sensitive information, such as their de-
vices’ MAC addresses and their exact association locations.
In this work, we aim to study whether such sanitization mea-
sures are sufficient to protect user privacy. By simulating
an adversary’s role, we propose a novel type of correlation
attack in which the adversary uses the anonymized associ-
ation log to build signatures against each user, and when
combined with auxiliary information, such signatures can
help to identify users within the anonymized log. Using a
user association log that contains more than four thousand
users and millions of association records, we demonstrate
that this attack technique, under certain circumstances, is
able to pinpoint the victim’s identity exactly with a prob-
ability as high as 70%, or narrow it down to a set of 20
candidates with a probability close to 100%. We further
evaluate the effectiveness of standard anonymization tech-
niques, including generalization and perturbation, in miti-
gating correlation attacks; our experimental results reveal
only limited success of these methods, suggesting that more
thorough treatment is needed when anonymizing wireless
user association logs before public release.
1. INTRODUCTION
In many large-scale wireless local area networks (WLANs),
user association logs keep a record of each association and
disassociation event between users’ wireless devices and the
network’s access points (APs). Such traces collected from
production networks, when made available for research, play
a critical role in understanding user activity patterns, ana-
lyzing network protocol dynamics, and evaluating the per-
formance, reliability, and security of new network designs [SKJH06,
dOdA09, ST07]. We, at Dartmouth College, have moni-
tored a campus-wide WLAN for almost one decade and some
of our collected traces have been made public through our
CRAWDAD website [cra]. These network traces have been
extensively studied by the wireless research community and
have been used in more than 100 research publications.
To preserve users’ privacy, a trace publisher must sanitize
the network traces before sharing them with the public. Al-
though many network sanitization techniques have been pro-
posed and developed, recent research has shown that these
techniques provide limited protection against user (or host)
re-identification attacks. Existing sanitization techniques
usually deal with explicit sensitive fields in the dataset, such
as IP/MAC addresses, port number, and TCP/UDP pay-
loads, but ignore implicit information that can be poten-
tially extracted and used to identify an anonymized user
(or host). For an enterprise-wide network with thousands
of users, privacy analysis on wired network traces has been
widely studied to understand the severity of some poten-
tial trace-sharing risks [BA˚Ø05, OBA05, CWM+07]. How-
ever, similar research is scarce for enterprise-wide, large-
scale wireless networks [TYYK10, KH09]. As the edge of
the Internet is increasingly becoming wireless, and because
wireless networks have some unique characteristics, such as
user mobility, it is important to evaluate privacy threats
posed due to shared wireless network traces.
In this paper, we conduct privacy analysis on one of the
simplest wireless network traces, a user association log, col-
lected from a large-scale WLAN. Compared to other seman-
tically rich wireless-network traces, we would hope the sim-
plicity of the user association log could make it more resis-
tant to potential privacy risks. We consider the following
two questions: 1) Using only the “insensitive” information
in an anonymized user association log, is it possible to build
a unique signature for each user? These signatures, when
combined with some auxiliary information, such as a short-
term un-anonymized log, can be used to distinguish users
and infer some sensitive information from the anonymized
log. 2) If privacy breach is possible, how effective is a pro-
posed mitigation approach in preventing an adversary from
building such signatures?
In a nutshell, we make three major contributions in this
work. First, we simulate the role of an adversary and pro-
pose a “correlation attack” – a method based on Conditional
Random Field (CRF) – that can be used to breach user pri-
vacy from a released WLAN user association log. Second, we
use extensive experiments to demonstrate the effectiveness
of the CRF-based correlation attack. Using an anonymized
campus-wide WLAN user association log with more than
four thousand users and millions of user association records,
and a short-term observation of the victim’s association ac-
tivities, we show that the CRF-based correlation attack, un-
der certain circumstances, can reveal the victim’s identity
in the released dataset with a probability as high as 70%,
or narrow down the victim’s identity among 20 candidates
with a probability close to 100%. Third, we evaluate the
effectiveness of standard sanitization techniques, including
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generalization and perturbation, in mitigating the proposed
correlation attack; the results reveal only limited success of
these methods, suggesting that more thorough treatment is
needed when anonymizing wireless user association logs be-
fore the public release.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We
first present related work in Section 2. In Section 3, we in-
troduce how user association logs are collected in WLANs
and describe the common practice in sanitizing these data
before sharing them with the public. In Section 4, we discuss
the adversarial model and formulate the correlation attack
problem. We present in Section 5 how an adversary can use
a CRF-based technique to launch correlation attacks against
released user association datasets, and evaluate the attack
effectiveness of this method in Section 6. In Section 7, we
consider two widely used anonymization techniques, gener-
alization and perturbation, and evaluate their effectiveness
in mitigating CRF-based correlation attacks. Finally, we
draw concluding remarks in Section 8.
2. RELATEDWORK
To share network traces while preserving privacy, data
publishers usually define sanitization policies according to
their specific privacy concerns. These policies determine
which sanitization methods to apply and how. Many network-
trace sanitization techniques and software tools have been
proposed and implemented, such as FLAIM [SLL06] and
tcpmkpub [PAPL06], to fulfill the trace publishers’ sanitiza-
tion goals.
Due to the intrinsic complexity of network trace saniti-
zation, however, recent research has revealed that there are
few, if any, available network-trace sanitization schemes that
can provide a water-tight guarantee under the worst-case
analysis. These works often mimic the role of an adversary
that tries to launch a de-sanitization attack against the san-
itized trace. According to the employed attack strategies,
these de-sanitization research can be classified into two cate-
gories. Direct attacks exploit the limitations of a sanitization
algorithm [BA˚Ø05, OBA05, CWM+07]. Indirect attacks
use implicit information contained in the trace [CWM+07,
FMT+06, BMG+08, PGG+07], auxiliary information ob-
tained from other sources [KYH08, CWM+07, PGG+07], or
new techniques from other research fields, such as machine
learning [CCW+07, BCKP08, PGG+07, BMG+08], to un-
cover sensitive information from anonymized network traces.
In the domain of wireless networks, many physical-device-
fingerprinting techniques could potentially be used to launch
de-sanitization attacks [FMT+06, BMG+08, BCKP08]. Be-
cause most of these techniques work by monitoring unique
variations in protocol behaviors, such as those seen across
different vendors or device-driver implementations, they of-
ten require very-high-resolution data or even special mea-
surement equipment. Such requirements greatly limit their
applicability for de-sanitization on most types of released
traces. Some other researchers have focused on how to fin-
gerprint users. For instance, Pang et al. demonstrated that
by combining information from multiple sources together,
such as destination address, broadcast packet size and IEEE
802.11 MAC protocol fields, an adversary could uniquely
identify users under certain circumstances [PGG+07]. Their
techniques, however, rely on much more abundant trace se-
mantics than our work and have only been evaluated with
much smaller wireless network traces than the one we used.
Previously, we speculated a potential threat against user
mobility privacy in a general sense [TYYK10]. Most close
to this work, Kumar and Helmy have recently shown that it
is possible to breach privacy from WLAN user association
logs [KH09]. Their attack model assumes that the adver-
sary can inject data into the wireless network during the
trace collection or has some out-of-band information such
as the victim’s academic major and gender. In practice,
these conditions may be difficult to satisfy. The type of at-
tacks we discuss in this paper, however, do not require these
assumptions.
Location privacy has been investigated in diverse commu-
nication networks in the past few years. Krumm presented
a comprehensive survey of computational location privacy,
in which users’ location data are treated as geometric in-
formation [Kru09]. Hoh et al. analyzed a set of week-long
GPS traces from 233 vehicles and showed that applying pre-
vious privacy algorithms either led to inaccurate results or
failed to provide privacy guarantees; they further proposed
an uncertainty-aware algorithm that is able to preserve pri-
vacy for all vehicles [HGXA07]. In comparison, the trace
used in our work covered thousands of users and more than
two months. Location privacy in sensor networks has also
been studied under different adversarial models [OLL+08,
MLW07, OZT04]. Our work differs from this line of research
because it considers location privacy in a different network
environment, which leads to a different threat model. For
example, we do not assume that the adversary is capable of
monitoring the entire network traffic in our work.
Narayanan et al. proposed a method to robustly de-
anonymize a large dataset [NS08]. Their work is based on
the assumption that the studied dataset is highly sparse;
for example, in their studied Netflix dataset, the number of
attributes (movies) is twenty times more than the number
of potential targets (Netflix subscribers). In our study, we
make no assumptions about the sparsity of user association
logs.
Privacy has been intensively studied for a long time in
the database field. Concepts such as k-anonymity [SS98],
l-diversity [MGKV06], t-closeness [LLV07], and differential
privacy [Dwo06] have been analyzed in a theoretical manner
under many settings [GKS08, CKLM09, BA05]. Most re-
lated techniques aim to anonymize microdata, which is rep-
resented as a tuple with multiple attributes in a database ta-
ble. The user association log, however, contains information
with sequential semantics. An interesting research direc-
tion would be to develop methods to cast existing privacy-
preservation concepts into a framework able to deal with se-
quential data, as required in sanitizing user association logs
collected from WLANs, and we plan to explore further along
this line in our future work. Recently, some efforts on ana-
lyzing privacy of graph data have shown that sensitive infor-
mation in social network data can be de-anonymized [ZG07,
BCKS09, NS09]. Our work differs from this line of research
because we deal with sequential activity data corresponding
to individual users instead of the social graphs formed by
the users.
3. WLAN USER ASSOCIATION LOGS
At Dartmouth College, we have been monitoring the campus-
wide WLAN network usage since 2001. As of January 2010,
this WLAN network consists of over 1300 Aruba APs that
provide 54Mbps coverage to the entire campus. These Aruba
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APs are connected with and controlled by a small set of
Aruba Mobility Controllers. We poll every controller ev-
ery 5 minutes using the SNMP protocol and receive replies.
In addition to traffic statistics, these replies contain a list
of devices associated with every AP. After processing these
replies, each row of the resulting user association log col-
lected, which we call a user association record, has 4 comma-
separated fields: the MAC address of the wireless card, the
name of the AP that the wireless card has connected with,
and the start and the end POSIX timestamp of this con-
nection. The following is a snippet of the user association
log that we extract from the SNMP information (it shows
anonymized MAC addresses to protect user privacy):
001d4f3bc496,14.5.1, 1251690285,1251691544
002608e4cdf7,80.3.2, 1251690458,1251691544
0021e9082bfd,142.6.1,1251689384,1251691544
0016cf29eb6d,76.5.3, 1251691151,1251691544
001cb3b51b58,188.4.6,1251689569,1251691544
0016cf295f33,206.5.7,1251688817,1251691544
There are a few things worth noting. First, although it is
possible that a wireless card may have been used in multiple
devices or a device has been used by multiple people, we
assume that such cases are rare in our dataset. Hence in
this paper we use a “wireless card” and a “network user”
(or a “user”) interchangeably. Second, because the Aruba
Mobility Controller only generates the start timestamp for
each connection and we poll the controller every 5 minutes,
the connection’s end timestamp is only an estimated value,
whose error is therefore bounded by 5 minutes. Third, we
use a hierarchical naming scheme for APs in the dataset.
For an AP named x.y.z, x is its building number, y is its
floor number, and z is its serial number within the floor.
Sanitization. When sanitizing the user association logs,
we use a one-to-one mapping function to rename the MAC
addresses in the original dataset. Hence, the anonymized
MAC addresses in the sanitized dataset do not have any
physical meaning and are thus only symbolic names; a simi-
lar sanitization scheme has been used in other work [KH09].
By taking advantage of its hierarchical naming scheme, we
truncate an AP’s name according to different sanitization
levels. For example, if we want to only keep building and
floor information, we truncate the AP’s name from x.y.z to
x.y.
4. THREATMODELANDPROBLEMFOR-
MULATION
Complying with Narayanan’s definition of privacy breach [NS08],
the threat we study here is whether the limited insensitive
information left in a sanitized association log could still form
implicit signatures for individual users. These implicit signa-
tures, when combined with auxiliary information, may pro-
vide the adversary the knowledge that the sanitization pro-
cess has aimed to protect, such as whether an anonymized
ID in the released dataset corresponds to a specific user. We
make the following three assumptions in our threat model:
Assumption 1: The adversary has access to a sanitized
WLAN user association log Ls, which is shared to the public
by a trace publisher. There are Ns users in this association
log. All users’ real MAC addresses are anonymized in Ls
as follows: during the trace publisher’s sanitization process,
each real MAC address has been replaced with a new identi-
fier IDi (1 ≤ i ≤ Ns) according to some one-to-one one-way
mapping function. Hence, given an anonymized MAC ad-
dress IDi, the adversary cannot find the real MAC address
that is mapped to IDi. The AP’s name can be either pre-
served or truncated. The rest of the fields, such as the start
and end timestamp of each connection, are preserved during
the sanitization process.
Assumption 2: The adversary knows a sequence of asso-
ciation records about a victim user’s device. This sequence
of records, Q, need not be collected during the same time
period as Ls (otherwise the problem will be trivial). It is
important to note that the information provided in Q can
be rather coarse. For example, the adversary may only need
to know which buildings the victim has visited rather than
which exact APs the victim has associated with.
There are a few ways for the adversary to obtain such
information: (1) The adversary has some general knowl-
edge about the victim. For example, the adversary knows
the victim often stays in the library in the morning for 2
hours and then goes to the classroom around 3pm in the
afternoon. (2) The adversary can manage to install some
trojan software on the victim’s device through some social
engineering techniques (e.g., email attachments) or exploit-
ing software vulnerabilities on the victim’s device. The tro-
jan secretly monitors the network association/disassociation
activities of the device and reports them to the adversary
through covert channels. (3) The adversary follows the vic-
tim physically and monitors the victim’s network associa-
tion/disassociation activities. For instance, when the victim
opens a laptop, usually the laptop will automatically find the
closest AP and connect to it, which leads to an association
record. (4) The adversary can obtain the user association
records of the victim user from a different dataset L′, which
may or may not be published by the same publisher as Ls.
L′ may be produced using a weak anonymization scheme
(or even no sanitization at all) so that it is easier for the
adversary to identify the victim’s AP association records in
it than in Ls.
Assumption 3: The adversary knows that the sanitized
dataset Ls must contain the victim’s AP association records.
In many cases, Ls is published at an organization level (e.g.,
by a university) and thus contains complete AP association
logs of the organization’s wireless users. Hence, if the adver-
sary knows that the victim was a member of the organization
when Ls was collected, it is easy for him to know that Ls
should contain the victim’s AP association records.
Given the three assumptions in the adversarial model, the
(exact) correlation attack problem is then formulated as fol-
lows: given Ls and Q, which anonymized identity IDi (1 ≤
i ≤ Ns) in Ls has also generated Q? In practice, however,
due to incomplete data for training or inference, or some
intra- and inter-user association activity variations, finding
an algorithm to solve the exact correlation attack problem
is difficult or even impossible. In this work, we consider
a relaxed and more practical version of this problem. The
(relaxed) correlation attack problem is formulated as follows:
given Ls and Q, which subset of anonymized identities would
contain the one that generated Q with high probability?
It is important to emphasize the difference between the
correlation attack problem and the mobility anomaly detec-
tion problem [SYW+06, YES09]. The latter one is stated
as follows: given the mobility history of a mobile user H,
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is a test mobility record R generated from the same user?
Although both problems are related to human mobility, the
distinction in their conditions (i.e., prior knowledge) sug-
gests the difference: The mobility anomaly detection prob-
lem is essentially a statistical hypothesis test, whose solution
does not require the knowledge of other users’ mobility his-
tory. In contrast, the correlation attack problem is about
classification: considering that there are Ns classes and we
know each class’s association records, we want to find the
correct class for the observed association sequence Q. Their
difference can further be explained with an example. It is
possible that the observed association sequence Q does not
exhibit the user’s regular mobility pattern and can thus be
treated as an anomaly in the mobility anomaly detection
problem. But as long as no other users have association
records closer to Q, we may still be able to find the correct
class for Q in the correlation attack problem.
5. ALGORITHM DESCRIPTION
The intuition behind the proposed algorithm is that hu-
man activities often follow certain regularities. These regu-
larities are inherent in the temporal and spatial information
of the association log, whether or not the log is sanitized.
Different users may have different association patterns, and
we can use such differences to fingerprint and distinguish
users. To this end, we build a model that not only charac-
terizes such inter-user differences but also is robust to intra-
user variations. In the previous section, we formulate cor-
relation attack as a classification problem, in which the two
key components are feature representation and the learning
algorithm. We use association activity templates to repre-
sent user association logs and employ CRF as the learning
algorithm.
5.1 Data Representation
Previously, there are two general approaches to repre-
sent user association activities: direct representation and
abstract representation. The method proposed by Song et
al. [SKJH06], for instance, is a typical direct representation
that puts all visited APs in an AP transition vector and
the corresponding duration at each AP in a duration vector.
Suppose that a user has traveled from AP1, AP2 to AP3
sequentially and connected with each AP for 30, 45, 25 min-
utes respectively. Then, the corresponding AP transition
vector is [AP1, AP2, AP3] and the duration vector is [30
min, 45 min, 25 min]. While this method captures every AP
association transition, it ignores other potentially valuable
information, such as when the connection took place. On
the other hand, the abstract representation method, such
as Hsu et al.’s normalized association vector [HDH07], aims
to capture the overall trend of AP association changes at
the expense of losing many details during the abstraction
process.
As the previous data representation methods ignore de-
tails that are important to classification, we propose a new
approach that uses association activity templates to repre-
sent user association logs. In this method, we first split the
user’s association log into day-to-day pieces and then for
each day build an individual association activity template,
because human activities often exhibit regularities associ-
ated with days of the week. An association activity tem-
plate is a collection of association activity tags and their
corresponding association activity vectors. As shown in Fig-
Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day N......
AP3 AP 5 AP 7 AP 5 AP 6
Feature 
1
Feature
2
Feature 
3
... 
Association
activity 
template
AP 1 T 1 T 2 AP 3 T 3 T 4 AP 6 T 8 T 9......
User 
association 
log
Day-to-day
log
......
Feature 
1
Feature
2
Feature 
3
... 
Feature 
1
Feature
2
Feature 
3
... 
Feature 
1
Feature
2
Feature 
3
... 
Feature 
1
Feature
2
Feature 
3
... 
......
......
Association
activity
tag
Association
activity
vector
Figure 1: Represent an user’s association log using
association activity template.
ure 1, the association activity tag is the name of the visited
AP. Each element in an association activity vector is called
a feature. In the current implementation, we let an activ-
ity vector have six features: duration, day of week, starting
time, previous AP, next to previous AP, and next AP . Ta-
ble 1 explains these features.
Several things are worth noting here. First, an association
activity vector does not correspond one-to-one with an AP
association record (i.e., a row in the user association log).
This is because an association activity vector resides in an
association activity template that only holds association in-
formation for a specific 24-hour calendar day. Thus, if an AP
association record spans multiple days, it is divided into sev-
eral association activity templates and represented by multi-
ple association activity vectors inside these templates. The
duration feature in an association activity vector follows this
manner. If a connection is entirely contained in a 24-hour
calendar day, the value of duration is the end timestamp less
the start timestamp. If a connection spans several days, the
value of duration is equal to this connection’s cumulative
amount of time in the corresponding 24-hour calendar day.
Given the duration feature’s maximum value is 24 hours, it is
intrinsically normalized on a 24-hour base. Second, instead
of assigning an exact time (hour, minute and second) to the
starting time feature, we divide a day into six 4-hour slots
(midnight, dawn, morning, afternoon, evening, and night)
and use the name of these slots as the coarse start time.
As shown in Kim’s work [KK07], although user association
behaviors have periodic patterns, they also have some vari-
ations. Compared to the exact representation, representing
the time at a coarse level adds some tolerance for these vari-
ations. Third, at the beginning of each day, we assign a
special string “NA” to the previous AP and next-to-previous
AP features; similarly, we let the next AP feature be “NA”
at the end of a day. Fourth, if a user is offline all day, no
association activity template is generated for her that day.
5.2 Algorithm Procedure
To give a big picture about how the correlation attack
works, we describe the attack algorithm in this section and
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Table 1: Features of an association activity vector
Feature
name
Meaning Value Comments
duration Adjusted con-
nection dura-
tion
Integer Normalized,
inspired
by Hsu’s
work [HDH07]
day of
week
Day of the
week of this
record
Enum. type,
from Monday to
Sunday
To represent
periodic
patterns,
inspired by
Kim’s
work [KK07]
starting
time
Time slot of
a day of this
record
Enum. type,
from Midnight
to Night
previous
AP
The AP in
the previous
record
String, AP’s
name
To represent
context
information,
inspired by
Song’s
work [SKJH06]
and Yam-
Cha [KM00]
next-to-
previous
AP
The AP in
the next-
to-previous
record
next
AP
The AP in the
next record
defer the introduction to CRF to Section 5.3.
Step 1. For each user in Ls, split his/her association log
into day-to-day pieces and represent each day’s log us-
ing an association activity template as described in
Section 5.1.
Step 2. Feed each user’s association activity templates into
a linear-chain CRF to model this user’s association
behavior. As there are Ns users in Ls, we build Ns
CRF models. The input fed to a CRF model is a
sequence of association activity vectors (Figure 1) and
the output is a sequence of association activity tags,
which are actually AP names. Let CRFi(V) denote the
output from the i-th user’s CRF model, where 1 ≤ i ≤
Ns and V denotes the sequence of association activity
vectors fed to the CRF model.
Step 3. For the observed user association record Q, we
preprocess it as described in Section 5.1 to obtain an
association activity template T . Let VT and GT denote
the sequence of association activity vectors and the
sequence of association activity tags in template T ,
respectively.
Step 4. We feed VT to all CRF models trained in Step
2 and count the number of tags that overlap between
GT and CRFi(VT ) (1 ≤ i ≤ Ns), a score we denote
wi. The intuition applied here is that the victim’s
CRF model is more likely to produce correct activity
association tags from her observed activity association
vectors in Q, and therefore score wi is higher than the
others if IDi is the victim’s identifier in the released
user association log.
Step 5. We sort all users based on score wi in non-increasing
order and the algorithm outputs this sorted list.
Ideally the top identifier on the sorted list should be treated
as the sole candidate that generated the observed user asso-
ciation sequence Q. In practice, however, due to incomplete
data for training or inference, or some intra- and inter-user
association activity variations, the top identifier may not
correspond to the victim who produced Q. As mentioned
earlier, we tackle the relaxed correlation attack problem
instead and thus use a small number of top identifiers on
the sorted list. Clearly, from the attacker’s perspective, the
smaller the number of top identifiers needed to include the
victim’s, the more successful his attack.
5.3 Conditional Random Field
One may wonder why we chose CRF models to character-
ize users’ AP association behaviors. We explain this choice
by analyzing the nature of the correlation attack problem
and also provide a brief introduction to CRF.
Let X = (X1, X2, ..., Xn) denote a random variable of an
observed sequence, each element of which has k features. In
our problem, a realization of X is a sequence of association
activity vectors with the six features described in Table 1.
Let Y denote a random variable of a label sequence. A label
here is actually an association activity tag that indicates an
AP name. According to Figure 1, each association activ-
ity vector corresponds to an association activity tag. Hence,
given an observed sequence of X (i.e., sequence VT in Step 3
of the algorithm shown in Section 5.2), we need to produce
a label sequence for it. It is thus a task of assigning label se-
quences to observation sequences, which is common to many
applications in bioinformatics, computational linguistics and
speed recognition [DEKM98, MFP00, RJ93].
We now explain why here we do not use Hidden Markov
Model (HMM), a popular probabilistic sequence model that
characterizes the joint distribution p(X,Y ) directly [Rab89].
HMM is known to be a generative model in the field of
graphical models. The challenge facing HMM is that it has
to model the entire set of observation sequences p(X) ex-
plicitly, which is intractable in our case (and many other
domains) for two reasons. First, the limited data collected
from real-life network measurement makes it difficult to ob-
tain a full-fledged p(X). Second, the features in X (the
features in the association activity vector) can be highly
correlated. For example, Song’s work shows that there is a
strong correlation between the lastest three APs visited by
an user [SKJH06]. Kim’s work demonstrates that the time
and the location that a user will visit may follow a period-
ical pattern [KK07]. Such dependences among features are
difficult to model within HMM. To circumvent the problem,
generative models like HMM and Naive Bayes make inde-
pendence assumptions that may not be realistic in practice.
Note, however, that modeling the joint distribution for
X and Y (i.e., p(X,Y )) is not important for the sequence
labeling problem at all, because the observation sequences
have already been available to us. What is needed is ac-
tually finding the conditional probability p(Y |X) from the
training dataset. Although it is possible to derive p(Y |X)
as p(Y )p(X|Y )
p(X)
based on Bayes’ rule, the need to model the
marginal distribution p(X) makes it a difficult approach.
The CRF method, in contrast, eliminates the necessity of
knowing p(X) by building models to predict label sequences
Y conditional on observation sequences X. Hence, CRF is
indifferent to the dependence among features in X because
X is now treated as given (i.e., a condition). Because CRF
models the conditional probability p(Y |X) instead of the
joint distribution p(X,Y ), it is a discriminative approach
rather than a generative one.
5
CRF is a special type of undirected graphic model. Let
C denote the entire set of cliques, which are fully connected
subgraphs, in the graph. A clique C ∈ C contains variables
from X, denoted XC , and also variables from Y , denoted
YC . For a generic CRF, the goal is to learn the following
conditional distribution from the training data:
p(Y |X) = 1
Z(X)
Y
C∈C
ψC(YC , XC), (1)
where Z(X), sometimes called the partition function, is a
normalization factor and is given by:
Z(X) =
X
Y
Y
C∈C
ψC(YC , XC). (2)
Furthermore, ψC is a real-valued potential function on
clique C; a commonly used function is:
ψC(YC , XC) = exp(
X
i
λifi(YC , XC)), (3)
where fi is a feature function and λi is the weight of feature
function fi.
There is a special type of CRF models, called linear-
chain CRF models, which are particularly useful for solv-
ing sequence labeling problems. Linear-chain CRF models
are conditionally trained as linear chains, instead of generic
undirected graphical models. In Figure 2, we show a linear-
chain CRF, where the node representing X is not generated
from the model. In a linear-chain CRF, the set of cliques C
contains every node (cliques of size 1) and every edge (cliques
of size 2) in the graph. Hence, the conditional probability
distribution is given by:
p(Y |X) = 1
Z(X)
nY
i=1
ψi(Yi, X)ψ
′
i(Yi, Yi−1, X), (4)
where
ψi(Yi, X) = exp(
kX
j=1
θjsj(Yi, X, i)) (5)
ψ′i(Yi, Yi−1, X) = exp(
kX
j=1
λjtj(Yi−1, Yi, X, i)). (6)
In the above equations, sj is a state feature function of a
label variable, and tj is a transition feature function that
depends on two consecutive label variables; θj and λj are
parameters for the linear-chain CRF. As there is no transi-
tion from Y0 to Y1, we can simply let λ1 be 0. In this work,
we used CRFsuite [Oka07], a linear-chain CRF implemen-
tation for parameter estimation and inference, and defined
the state feature function and transition feature function
as boolean functions, which are similar to those in Sutton
and McCallun’s book [SM06]. It is worth noting that many
methods have been proposed to train linear-chain CRF mod-
els and use them for inference. Due to space limitation, we
refer interested readers to the literature for more thorough
treatment on the topic of CRF [SM06, LMP01, Wal04].
6. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of the CRF-
based method for correlation attacks. We use the user asso-
ciation log extracted from the SNMP log collected at Dart-
mouth College between January 4, 2010 and March 6, 2010,
Y2 Y3 Yn−1 YnY1
...
1 2 n−1X=X , X , ..., X   , Xn
Label variable Observed variable
Figure 2: Illustration of linear-chain CRF.
which in total covered 62 days corresponding to one aca-
demic term. In the original dataset, there were 19,579 dis-
tinct MAC addresses, which contributed to 3,076,318 associ-
ation records. Because the WLAN at Dartmouth College is
an open network, any one physically at the campus site can
use this network for free, and thus a great portion of MAC
addresses belong to visitors who have appeared in the logs
for only a short period of time. As training CRF models
for these transient users would be difficult due to insuffi-
cient data, we filtered out those users who were active in
fewer than 45 days during this 62-day period, and the re-
sulting dataset still contained 79.67% of the user association
records with 4,285 distinct users and 1,364 distinct APs. We
used this reduced dataset for the experiments below. All the
experiments were performed on four commodity PCs, which
took around four days to finish.
We use the Minimum Size of Candidate Identifier Set
(MSCIS) as the metric to measure the attack efficiency.
Consider the relaxed correlation attack problem with a san-
itized user association dataset Ls and an observed sequence
of AP association records Q. For each IDi where 1 ≤ i ≤ Ns
in Ls, we compute score wi according to Step 4 in the CRF-
based method. Suppose that IDj is the user ID of the victim
who generated Q. The MSCIS is defined as the number of
user IDs whose scores are no smaller than wj . MSCIS es-
tablishes an upper bound on how many candidate user IDs
need be considered in order to contain the victim’s user ID
in the sanitized dataset. Note that if a user has the same
score as the victim’s (i.e., wj), his ID should also be counted
into MSCIS.
We perform 10-round leave-one-out experiments. The 62-
day user association log is partitioned into 10 bins of ap-
proximately the same length for each user. In the j-th round
(1 ≤ j ≤ 10), we use the j-th bin of each user’s association
records as the testing dataset (Lu) and the remaining nine
as the training dataset (Ls) to build the CRF models. The
results shown below are the 10-round averages.
To set up a baseline case for comparison, we developed a
simple distance-based method described as follows:
Step 1. For each user in Ls, we build a time vector each
day that contains how much time this user spent at
each AP. The length of a time vector is equal to the to-
tal number of unique APs in the trace, and the number
of time vectors for a given user is equal to the number
of days that the user appeared in Ls.
Step 2. Similarly, we compute a set of daily time vectors
for each user in Lu.
Step 3. For each user in Lu, we compute the Euclidean
distance between each of her time vectors and every
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Figure 3: Relationship between the attack perfor-
mance and the amount of auxiliary information
user’s time vectors in Ls, to obtain an average score
for every user in Ls.
Step 4. For each user in Lu, we sort the scores derived from
Step 3 in non-descreasing order to obtain a sorted list
of user IDs in Ls, then compute the MSCIS for each
user in Lu.
Figure 3 compares the results of the CRF-based method
and the distance-based method. The sanitization is done
by anonymizing only the MAC addresses but leaving the
other fields intact (other sanitization strategies will be ex-
amined in Section 7). When the length of Q is 5-6 days, the
CRF-based method significantly outperforms the distance-
based method in attack efficiency: 73.21% of the 4,285 users
can be pinpointed exactly from Ls; for 80.12% of the users,
their MSCIS is no more than 2, meaning that the victim’s
ID appears among the top two candidates according to the
CRF-based method; for 99.72% of the users, their MSCIS
is no more than 20. Hence, using the CRF-based method,
the adversary could almost surely narrow down the victim’s
possible user ID into a set of 20 candidates from the user
association dataset with more than 4,000 users.
By tuning the length of Q to different values (from 5-6
days to 2 or 3 days), we show how the amount of auxiliary
knowledge affects the attack efficiency. Clearly, reducing
the auxiliary knowledge available to the attacker (shorter
Q) degrades the performance of the attack. However, even
in the worst case here that the length of Q is only two days,
the adversary still can pinpoint her identity exactly from
Ls with probability 61.67%, and for 98.51% of the users, he
can narrow down her identity in Ls to only 20 candidates.
From the attacker’s perspective, this is favorable because
he needs to know a victim’s association activities for only a
short period to launch the correlation attack effectively.
7. MITIGATION STRATEGIES
In the previous section, we play an adversary’s role and
evaluate the effectiveness of the CRF-based correlation at-
tack under different amount of auxiliary information. As
a network trace publisher in real life and the host of the
CRAWDAD website [cra], we are also interested in how
well standard sanitization measures can prevent such pri-
vacy breaches.
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Figure 4: Effectiveness of generalization-based mit-
igation against the proposed correlation attack.
Generally speaking, there are four categories of approaches
to anonymizing datasets to protect privacy: suppression-
based methods remove information from the data, generalization-
based methods coarsen the level of information released in
the data, perturbation-based methods add noise into the
data, and permutation-based methods swap sensitive asso-
ciations between entities [CS09]. Because the information
provided in a user association record is already limited, re-
moving any field in it would make a released dataset hard to
use. On the other hand, the identity information in released
AP association records has been anonymized and thus swap-
ping identity information between different users does not
prevent correlation attacks discussed in this work. There-
fore, in the following we focus on analyzing the effectiveness
of generalization-based and perturbation-based methods in
mitigating correlation attacks.
7.1 Generalization
Recall that the AP-naming scheme in the user association
logs uses a hierarchical structure: building ID, floor level,
and AP serial number. Hence, it is natural to apply gener-
alization on the AP names. We consider two generalization
schemes here: one keeping only the building information of
each AP, and the other keeping both the building ID and
the floor level. Using these two generalization schemes, we
obtain two anonymized datasets and then apply the CRF-
based method to launch correlation attacks against them.
The results, together with results from CRF without any
generalization, are depicted in Figure 4. All the experiments
in Section 7 work on the same sanitized dataset Ls and un-
sanitized dataset Lu (with 5-6 days) as those in the previous
section.
It is clear that applying generalization-based anonymiza-
tion techniques helps mitigate correlation attacks. For in-
stance, keeping the building and floor level information, the
probability of pinpointing the exact user is reduced from
73.21% to 70.92%, and the probability of having the vic-
tim appear among the top five candidates is reduced from
92.09% to 83.64%; keeping only the building information,
the top one and top five ratios are further reduced to 64.78%
and 74.10%, respectively. On the other hand, because keep-
ing only the AP’s building information is the best we can do
to generalize AP names, we can see only limited effective-
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ness of generalization-based schemes in mitigating correla-
tion attacks on user association logs. As a further step, one
may consider anonymizing the building information, such
as using a one-way function to rename them. Its effective-
ness is, however, still questionable as Yoon’s work [YNLK06]
has shown that it is easy to re-identify the real building in-
formation even though they have been anonymized in our
previously published trace [HKAY04].
7.2 Perturbation
Perturbation is another commonly used technique for data
sanitization. Its key idea is to add some noise into the orig-
inal dataset such that user privacy can be preserved while
the usability of the dataset is still ensured. Based on the
characteristics of the user association logs, we consider two
perturbation methods: spatial perturbation and temporal
perturbation.
• The spatial perturbation method changes the AP in-
formation in the original dataset as follows. Let Si de-
note the sequence of user IDi’s AP association records,
sorted in increasing order of starting timestamps. For
each record Rj in Si, we change the AP in Rj to the
AP in Rj−1 with probability 15%, change it to the AP
in Rj+1 with probability 15%, or keep it intact with
probability 70%.
• The temporal perturbation method changes the start
and end timestamps in the original dataset as follows.
For each AP association record, we add Gaussian noise
with mean 0 and standard deviation 3600 seconds to
its start and end timestamps. During the process of
adding noise, we do it sequentially on each user’s AP
association records and ensure that the starting times-
tamp of the current AP association record is always
greater than the end timestamp of the previous AP
association record after noise is added.
The effectiveness of both methods in mitigating correla-
tion attacks is illustrated in Figure 5. Not surprisingly, both
methods make it more difficult for the adversary to launch
correlation attacks. Using spatial perturbation, the proba-
bility of pinpointing the exact user is reduced from 73.21%
to 67.14%, and the probability of having the victim appear
among the top five candidates is reduced from 92.09% to
88.03%. On the other hand, if temporal perturbation is ap-
plied, the top one and top five ratios are reduced to 60.77%
and 85.83%, respectively.
Considering the results in Figures 4 and 5, we conclude
that for all the mitigation techniques evaluated, their ef-
fectiveness in mitigating CRF-based correlation attacks is
rather limited. For instance, none of these methods is able to
reduce the probability of pinpointing the exact user ID below
55%. Although adding more noise in the perturbation-based
methods can further constrain the adversary’s capability in
launching correlation attacks, it may also damage the usabil-
ity of the released user association datasets. In our future
work, we shall consider the detailed use of user association
logs (e.g., predicting mobility of wireless users [SKJH06])
and further explore the tradeoff between their usability and
privacy.
8. CONCLUSION
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Figure 5: Effectiveness of perturbation-based miti-
gation against the proposed correlation attack.
User association logs collected from real-world WLANs
have played an important role in understanding these net-
works. Sharing them with the public, however, poses po-
tential risks to the privacy of the users involved. In this
work, we show that people’s association behaviors form im-
plicit signatures for individual users. When combined with
auxiliary information, such signatures can help reveal the
true identities of anonymized IDs in a sanitized WLAN user
association log. On a pessimistic note, standard anonymiza-
tion techniques, such as generalization and perturbation, are
unable to mitigate such CRF-based correlation attack effec-
tively. The results from this work call for a more thorough
study of potential privacy risks when wireless user associa-
tion logs are shared with the public.
9. REFERENCES
[BA05] R. J. Bayardo and R. Agrawal. Data privacy
through optimal k-anonymization. In
Proceedings of the 21st International
Conference on Data Engineering (ICDE),
pages 217–228. IEEE Computer Society, 2005.
DOI 10.1109/ICDE.2005.42.
[BA˚Ø05] T. Brekne, A. A˚rnes, and A. Øslebø.
Anonymization of IP traffic monitoring data:
Attacks on two prefix-preserving
anonymization schemes and some proposed
remedies. In Proceedings of the International
Symposium on Privacy Enhancing
Technologies (PET), pages 179–196.
Springer-Verlag, 2005. DOI
10.1007/11767831 12.
[BCKP08] S. Bratus, C. Cornelius, D. Kotz, and
D. Peebles. Active behavioral fingerprinting of
wireless devices. In Proceedings of the ACM
Conference on Wireless Network Security
(WiSec), pages 56–61. ACM Press, 2008. DOI
10.1145/1352533.1352543.
[BCKS09] S. Bhagat, G. Cormode, B. Krishnamurthy,
and D. Srivastava. Class-based graph
anonymization for social network data. In
Proceedings of the VLDB Endowment,
volume 2, pages 766–777. VLDB Endowment,
2009.
8
[BMG+08] K. Bauer, D. McCoy, B. Greenstein,
D. Grunwald, and D. Sicker. Using wireless
physical layer information to construct implicit
identifiers. In Proceedings of HotPETS 2008,
July 2008. Online at http://petsymposium.
org/2008/hotpets/mccoyd hotpets2008.pdf.
[CCW+07] S. E. Coull, M. P. Collins, C. V. Wright,
F. Monrose, and M. K. Reiter. On web
browsing privacy in anonymized netflows. In
Proceedings of the USENIX Security
Symposium, pages 1–14. USENIX, 2007.
Online at
http://www.usenix.org/publications/library/
proceedings/sec03/tech/bellardo.html.
[CKLM09] B.-C. Chen, D. Kifer, K. LeFevre, and
A. Machanavajjhala. Privacy-preserving data
publishing. Foundations and Trends in
Databases, 2(1–2):1–167, 2009. DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/1900000008.
[cra] Community Resource for Archiving Wireless
Data At Dartmouth (CRAWDAD).
http://www.crawdad.org/.
[CS09] G. Cormode and D. Srivastava. Anonymized
data: generation, models, usage. In
Proceedings of the 35th SIGMOD International
Conference on Management of Data
(SIGMOD), pages 1015–1018. ACM, 2009.
DOI 10.1145/1559845.1559968.
[CWM+07] S. E. Coull, C. V. Wright, F. Monrose, M. P.
Collins, and M. K. Reiter. Playing Devil’s
advocate: Inferring sensitive information from
anonymized network traces. In Proceedings of
the Annual Symposium on Network and
Distributed System Security (NDSS). IEEE
Press, February 2007. Online at
http://www.isoc.org/isoc/conferences/ndss/
07/papers/playing devils advocate.pdf.
[DEKM98] R. Durbin, S. Eddy, A. Krogh, and
G. Mitchison. Biological Sequence Analysis:
Probabilistic Models of Proteins and Nucleic
Acids. Cambridge University Press, 1998.
[dOdA09] E. C. R. de Oliveira and C. V. N.
de Albuquerque. NECTAR: a DTN routing
protocol based on neighborhood contact
history. In Proceedings of the 2009 ACM
Symposium on Applied Computing (SAC),
pages 40–46. ACM, 2009. DOI
10.1145/1529282.1529290.
[Dwo06] C. Dwork. Differential privacy. In Proceedings
of the 33rd International Colloquium on
Automata, Languages and Programming
(ICALP), pages 1–12. Springer, 2006.
[FMT+06] J. Franklin, D. McCoy, P. Tabriz, V. Neagoe,
J. V. Randwyk, and D. Sicker. Passive data
link layer 802.11 wireless device driver
fingerprinting. In Proceedings of USENIX
Security. USENIX, 2006. Online at
http://www.usenix.org/event/sec06/tech/
franklin.html.
[GKS08] S. R. Ganta, S. P. Kasiviswanathan, and
A. Smith. Composition attacks and auxiliary
information in data privacy. In Proceeding of
the 14th ACM SIGKDD International
Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data
Mining (KDD), pages 265–273. ACM, 2008.
DOI 10.1145/1401890.1401926.
[HDH07] W. J. Hsu, D. Dutta, and A. Helmy. Mining
behavioral groups in large wireless LANs. In
Proceedings of the 13th annual ACM
International Conference on Mobile Computing
and Networking (MobiCom), pages 338–341.
ACM, 2007. DOI 10.1145/1287853.1287899.
[HGXA07] B. Hoh, M. Gruteser, H. Xiong, and
A. Alrabady. Preserving privacy in GPS traces
via uncertainty-aware path cloaking. In
Proceedings of the ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security
(CCS), pages 161–171. ACM Press, 2007. DOI
10.1145/1315245.1315266.
[HKAY04] Tristan Henderson, David Kotz, Ilya Abyzov,
and Jihwang Yeo. CRAWDAD trace set
dartmouth/campus/snmp (v. 2004-11-09).
Downloaded from
http://crawdad.cs.dartmouth.edu/dartmouth/campus/snmp,
November 2004.
[KH09] U. Kumar and A. Helmy. Human behavior and
challenges of anonymizing WLAN traces. In
Proceedings of GLOBECOM, 2009.
[KK07] M. Kim and D. Kotz. Periodic properties of
user mobility and access-point popularity.
Journal of Personal and Ubiquitous
Computing, 11(6):465–479, August 2007.
Special Issue of papers from LoCA 2005, DOI
10.1007/s00779-006-0093-4.
[KM00] T. Kudoh and Y. Matsumoto. Use of support
vector learning for chunk identification. In
Proceedings of CoNLL-2000 and LLL-2000,
pages 142–144, 2000.
[Kru09] J. Krumm. A survey of computational location
privacy. Personal and Ubiquitous Computing,
13(6):391–399, 2009. DOI
10.1007/s00779-008-0212-5.
[KYH08] U. Kumar, N. Yadav, and A. Helmy.
Gender-based feature analysis in campus-wide
WLANs. SIGMOBILE Mobile Computing and
Communications Review, 12(1):40–42, 2008.
DOI 10.1145/1374512.1374525.
[LLV07] N. Li, T. Li, and S. Venkatasubramanian.
t-closeness: Privacy beyond k-anonymity and
`-diversity. In Proceedings of the International
Conference on Data Engineering (ICDE),
pages 106–115, 2007. DOI
10.1109/ICDE.2007.367856.
[LMP01] J. Lafferty, A. McCallum, and F. Pereira.
Conditional random fields: probabilistic
models for segmenting and labeling sequence
data. In Proceedings of the International
Conference on Machine Learning (ICML),
2001.
[MFP00] A. McCallum, D. Freitag, and F. Pereira.
Maximum entropy Markov models for
information extraction and segmentation. In
Proceedings of the International Conference on
Machine Learning (ICML), 2000.
9
[MGKV06] A. Machanavajjhala, J. Gehrke, D. Kifer, and
M. Venkitasubramaniam. `-diversity: Privacy
beyond k-anonymity. In Proceedings of the
International Conference on Data Engineering
(ICDE), pages 24–85, 2006. DOI
10.1109/ICDE.2006.1.
[MLW07] K. Mehta, D. Liu, and M. Wright. Location
privacy in sensor networks against a global
eavesdropper. In Proceedings of the IEEE
International Conference on Network Protocols
(ICNP), 2007.
[NS08] A. Narayanan and V. Shmatikov. Robust
de-anonymization of large sparse datasets. In
Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy (S&P), pages 111–125.
IEEE Press, 2008. DOI 10.1109/SP.2008.33.
[NS09] A. Narayanan and V. Shmatikov.
De-anonymizing social networks. In
Proceedings of the 30th IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy, pages 173–187. IEEE
Computer Society, 2009. DOI
10.1109/SP.2009.22.
[OBA05] L. Overlier, T. Brekne, and A. Arnes.
Non-expanding transaction specific
pseudonymization for IP traffic monitoring. In
Proceedings of the Cryptology and Network
Security (CANS), pages 261–273.
Springer-Verlag, 2005. DOI
10.1007/11599371 22.
[Oka07] N. Okazaki. CRFsuite: a fast implementation
of Conditional Random Fields (CRFs).
http://www.chokkan.org/software/crfsuite/,
2007.
[OLL+08] Y. Ouyang, Z. Le, D. Liu, J. Ford, and
F. Makedon. Source location privacy against
laptop-class attacks in sensor networks. In
Proceedings of the 4th International Conference
on Security and Privacy in Communication
Netowrks (SecureComm), pages 1–10. ACM,
2008. DOI 10.1145/1460877.1460884.
[OZT04] C. Ozturk, Y. Zhang, and W. Trappe.
Source-location privacy in energy-constrained
sensor network routing. In Proceedings of the
2nd ACM workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and
Sensor Networks (SASN), pages 88–93. ACM,
2004. DOI 10.1145/1029102.1029117.
[PAPL06] R. Pang, M. Allman, V. Paxson, and J. Lee.
The devil and packet trace anonymization.
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication
Review, 36(1):29–38, 2006. DOI
10.1145/1111322.1111330.
[PGG+07] J. Pang, B. Greenstein, R. Gummadi,
S. Seshan, and D. Wetherall. 802.11 user
fingerprinting. In Proceedings of the ACM
International Conference on Mobile Computing
and Networking (MobiCom), pages 99–110.
ACM Press, 2007. DOI
10.1145/1287853.1287866.
[Rab89] L. R. Rabiner. A tutorial on hidden Markov
models and selected applications in speech
recognition. Proceedings of the IEEE,
77(2):257–285, February 1989.
[RJ93] L. Rabiner and B. H. Juang. Fundamentals of
speech recognition. In Prentice Hall Signal
Processing Series. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1993.
[SKJH06] L. Song, D. Kotz, R. Jain, and X. He.
Evaluating next cell predictors with extensive
Wi-Fi mobility data. IEEE Transactions on
Mobile Computing, 5(12):1633–1649, December
2006. DOI 10.1109/TMC.2006.185.
[SLL06] A. Slagell, K. Lakkaraju, and K. Luo. FLAIM:
A multi-level anonymization framework for
computer and network logs. In Proceedings of
the USENIX Large Installation System
Administration Conference (LISA), December
2006. Online at http://www.usenix.org/
events/lisa06/tech/slagell.html.
[SM06] C. Sutton and A. McCallum. Introduction to
Conditional Random Fields for Relational
Learning. MIT Press, 2006.
[SS98] P. Samarati and L. Sweeney. Protecting
privacy when disclosing information:
k-anonymity and its enforcement through
generalization and suppression. Technical
Report SRI-CSL-98-04, Computer Science
Laboratory, SRI International, 1998. Online at
http://www.csl.sri.com/papers/sritr-98-04/.
[ST07] S. Sarat and A. Terzis. On the detection and
origin identification of mobile worms. In
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM Workshop on
Recurring Malcode (WORM), 2007. DOI
10.1145/1314389.1314401.
[SYW+06] B. Sun, F. Yu, K. Wu, Y. Xiao, and V. C. M.
Leung. Enhancing security using
mobility-based anomaly detection in cellular
mobile networks. IEEE Transactions on
Vehicular Technology, 55(3):1385–1396, 2006.
[TYYK10] K. Tan, G. Yan, J. Yeo, and D. Kotz. A
correlation attack against user mobility
privacy in a large-scale WLAN network
(extended abstract). In Proceedings of the
Mobicom S3 workshop, 2010.
[Wal04] H. M. Wallach. Conditional random fields: An
introduction. Technical Report MS-CIS-04-21,
University of Pennsylvania CIS, 2004.
[YES09] G. Yan, S. Eidenbenz, and B. Sun.
Mobi-watchdog: you can steal, but you can’t
run! In Proceedings of the Second ACM
Conference on Wireless Network Security
(WiSec), pages 139–150. ACM, 2009. DOI
10.1145/1514274.1514295.
[YNLK06] J. Yoon, B. D. Noble, M. Liu, and M. Kim.
Building realistic mobility models from
coarse-grained traces. In Proceedings of the 4th
International Conference on Mobile Systems,
Applications and Services (MobiSys), pages
177–190. ACM, 2006. DOI
10.1145/1134680.1134699.
[ZG07] E. Zheleva and L. Getoor. Preserving the
privacy of sensitive relationships in graph
data. In Proceedings of the 1st ACM SIGKDD
Workshop on Privacy, Security, and Trust in
KDD (PinKDD), 2007.
10
